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1. Destruction of Government Pasture 
 
Government pasture which covers about 100% of 
total pasture in Turkey has been fundamental resource to 
graze animals for more than one hundred years. Before 
1950, almost 50% of the country was covered by 
government pasture, so that there was abundant size of 
pasture resource that could satisfy the demand of animal 
products of those days. However, the size of 
government pasture has decreased sharply and the 
number of animals has increased since 1950. The 
former was caused by the conversion of government 
pasture to crop land which could satisfy more demand 
of cereals, and the latter was caused by augment of the 
demand of animal products, with growth of population. 
This contradiction has drawn the destruction of 
government pasture, which embraces two serious 
problems, that is the excessive conversion of 
government pasture and the overgrazing.  
1) Excessive Conversion of Government Pasture to 
Other Use 
It is necessary to convert government pasture to 
other use in order to meet the population growth. In fact, 
the large amount of government pasture has been 
converted under the direction of the government. The 
problem is the degree of conversion progression. The 
appropriate conversion that keeps government pasture 
satisfying the demand of animal products will be 
acceptable. But, under the current circumstance that the 
demand of animal products increase rapidly, the 
excessive conversion of government pasture makes 
matters worse. 
In fact, there has been fast decrease of government 
pasture and fast increases of agricultural land and other 
uses since 1950 as shown in Figure 11). The fast decrease 
of government pasture is connected with the excessive 
conversion of it. If the government pasture had been 
converted under the strict management of government, 
the pasture could have been converted appropriately. In 
actual fact, however, vast size of the pasture has been 
converted by farmers for the use of their private cropland 
without any permission of the government. This unlawful 
conversion defined as the intrusion, that is called as 
‘pasture attack (mera fecavozj), has caused the excessive 
conversion.  
2) Overgrazing  
The contradiction between decrease of government 
pasture and increase of number of animals brought about 
overgrazing. Overgrazing has caused grass quality of the 
government pasture worse. According to the results of 
shepherds interviews in Konya province,  the plant 
cover ratio of total government pasture was 75% before 
1980, but now this ratio has reduced to only 25%. 
Especially about 20% in the botanical composition of the 
government pasture are thorny (dikenli of), and animals 
can not eat them at all. Good grasses on the government 
pasture is not enough to sustain animals as many as 
before. This serious deterioration of the government 
pasture started since about 1980. The speed of decline in 
the size of the good quality grass pasture increased during 
the last two decades.  
 
2. Factors in Causing Destruction of Government 
Pasture    
 
1) Causing Factors of Excessive Conversion of 
Pasture 
The excessive conversion of pasture is caused by the 
improper institutional arrangements of land management. 
Especially the inefficient execution of the land registry 
law is the main causing factor. First we will state the land 
registry system in Turkey and then illustrate the problems 
of the system that has brought about the excessive 
conversion.  
 1-1) Land Registry System in Turkey 
All lands in Turkey are currently required to be 
registered as either private ownership or government 
ownership based on cadastral survey according to the 
land registry law (law no. 2644). Private ownership of 
land is indemnified by the title deed which is called 
 ‘tapu’. Before 1922, that is Ottoman Turkse empire 
days, land ownership was not clearly defined. Some 
parts were possessed by sultans, some were traditionally 
cultivated by peasants, and vast uncultivated land were 
used freely as common pasture by pastoralists. At the 
founding time of the state in 1923, huge uncultivated 
common pasture was taken by government. Thereafter, 
because of population growth and immigration, there 
has been strong social need to convert vast uncultivated 
government pasture to privately cultivated land. 
Government authorized the farmer who had reclaimed a 
certain area of cropland from the government pasture by 
himself and hold on to the area for long enough years 
such as 20 years to take possession of the area. Both the 
continuously cultivated land and the newly reclaimed 
land were obliged to be registered with ‘tapu’ according 
to the current land registry law of Turkey. But, in fact, 
issuing ‘tapu’ was very difficult work. 
1-2) Transaction Cost and Inefficient Execution of 
the Land Registry Law  
The cadastral office is in charge of issuing ‘tapu’ and 
indemnifying the legal ownership of the land in question 
to the owner under the control of director of state 
cadastral bureau. Land with ‘tapu’ must be demarcated 
strictly by the ‘tapu’ officials who actually came to check 
the ownership. But quite lots of expense are inevitable for 
the demarcation, because the cadastral officials should 
come to each plot, get the exact evidences of the 
ownership to the plot in question, and measure the plot. 
There are seldom formal written evidences for the plot in 
question, so that it is often very difficult to prove the 
ownership of the plot by the person who claims to own 
the plot.  
These expenses for demarcation and registration of 
land are the transaction costs. The reason of difficulties in 
issuing ‘tapu’ is that the transaction costs of establishing 
private ownership of land are too high. Due to high 
transaction cost, the current land registry law is not 
executed efficiently. Only 70% of whole land of Turkey 
has been registered with ‘tapu’ until now. The other 30% 
of land is still unregistered with ‘tapu’. A number of 
farmers who possess land without ‘tapu’ were 
interviewed in our field surveys in Adana and Konya 
province during the last few years. The unregistered land 
is called as customary land (zilyet). Holders of the 
customary land have faced such severe problems as 
difficulties in disposal by sale, in inheritance, and in 
mortgaging during the past few decades.  
1-3) Pasture Attack and Excessive Conversion of 
Government Pasture 
The difficulty of lawful demarcation is linked to the 
facility of unlawful border transgression. It is very 
difficult for the government to monitor and restrict each 
unjust farmer who appropriates the government pasture 
unlawfully, because of the extremely high transaction cost 
to do so. Therefore, the government pasture has been 
attacked under the current land registry law as fallows. 
Government pasture has been always allowed to be 
used only for common grazing. But it is said that unjust 
farmers had started to attack pastures or to intrude 
government pastures in 1950-60’s. That was the time 
when farmers were able to expand their cultivated land 
more easily by technological improvement such as switch 
from animal draft to tractor draft. This unlawful intrusion 
started to decrease since 1980’s, because deterioration of 
the government pasture became too severe. However, 
30~40% of the total government pasture was already 
unlawfully converted to private crop land in Turkey by 
then. Many cases of pasture attack found in field survey 
of Konya and Adana give evidences to high transaction 
cost for preventing intrusions2). Unlawful pasture attack 
resulted in the excessive conversion and fast decrease of 
the government pasture. 
2) Causing Factors of Overgrazing 
The overgrazing is considered to be caused by (1) 
tragedy of commons, and (2) excessive conversion of 
government pasture.  
The first factor is what we call tragedy of commons3）. 
The government pastures are being allocated among 
animal-grazing villages in Turkey. In other words, there is 
the village common pasture that belongs to government 
property, that is to say village government pasture, in 
every animal-raising village. The village government 
pasture is the village common pool resource that any 
member of village can have accesses to nonexclusively. 
As the demand of animal products increased, individual 
member of village were motivated to add more number 
of animals to herds on the village government pasture. 
The overgrazing is caused by the fact that size of the 
government pasture is limited compared with the 
increasing population of animals. Each individuals try to 
use as much grass as possible to increase his income 
directly. Animals added non-exclusively to the total herds 
by him and others deteriorates the grasses on the village 
government pasture. Every individuals are suffered from 
the deterioration of pasture relatively less than the gain 
 from additional animals, so that they will continue to add 
animals to graze over the total optimum number of 
animals on the pasture. Each individual does not stop 
continuing to add animals, because his activities are not 
rewarded individually to him, but only externalized to the 
other users. Ultimately the grass on the village 
government pasture will be destroyed. 
Second, the excessive conversion of the government 
pasture has also induced overgrazing problems. 
Decrease in size of the government pasture makes 
shepherds face the problem of grass shortage. Thus they 
could not help to start bringing their animals to the 
government pasture much earlier than the optimum 
season. They had to start grazing their animals just after 
snow melt (around 15 Feb). But this date is too early for 
the grass to grow appropriately. Once growing points of 
grass has been eaten by the animals, grass loses the power 
to grow well. This early grazing also deteriorates the 
quantity and quality of grass. 
The overgrazing based on tragedy of commons and 
excessive conversion of pasture has caused severe 
degradation of government pasture. In addition, decrease 
of precipitation of last two decades has accelerated the 
speed of degradation. According to the results of the 
village elders interviews in Konya province, the speed of 
degradation of the government pasture increased along 
with the decrease of rainfall on pasture for the last two 
decades. There must be the strong causality between the 
government pasture degradation and the precipitation 
decrease.  
 
3. Enactment of the Pasture Law  
 
The excessive conversion based on pasture attack and 
the overgrazing of the government pasture have severely 
decreased both quantity and quality of grass on it during 
the past four decades. These problems were caused by 
inefficient institutional arrangements under the current 
land registry law system. The government introduced 
new institutional arrangements in order to restore and 
conserve the government pasture with the enactment of 
pasture law (law no.4342) in February 1998. Under the 
new arrangements the following objectives were sought.  
(1) To delineate the border between private cropland 
and the government pasture. 
(2) To confiscate the intruded government pasture 
area. 
 
(3) To implement the project for improving grass 
quality on pasture. Subsidized fertilizer and grass 
seeds are often provided to shepherds and 
farmers. 
(4) To assign use right of demarcated government 
pasture to the authority of village community. 
(1), (2) are executed as follows. Extension service 
workers and cadastral officials are jointly in charge of 
attaining these objectives. First, the boundary stones are 
placed on the border between the government pasture and 
private crop land based on the cadastral map (kadastral 
pafta). The farmers who admit the stoned border must 
voluntarily limit their crop land up to the stoned one. But 
in many cases farmers object the stoned border and 
continue to occupy the intruded area. Therefore, second, 
the heads of villages are obliged to investigate the 
intrusion according to the stoned border. If he finds it, he 
must report to the extension workers regarding location of 
the doubtful area. Third, a survey map (tecavus krokisi) of 
the doubtful area is drawn by an actual survey. Fourth, in 
the case where the fact of intrusion is proved, the intruder 
are warned by the government. Unless he will returned 
the intruded area to the government in 4years from the 
warning, he is supposed to be sentenced 2-3 months’ 
imprisonment. Though the law was enacted, however, 
still only a small portion of the illegally intruded area of 
the government pasture has been delineated or 
confiscated (see table 1).  
(3) and (4) are performed such as the following two 
cases. One case is Karakislakci village of Adana 
Province. The village government pasture consists of 
500da summer pasture (Yayla) and 1,000da hilly pasture 
(1da = 0.1ha). Those pastures belong to the government 
land, but the use right is assigned to the village according 
to the pasture law. The pastures are divided into some 
plots and only one plot is permitted to be used for grazing 
in one season. If a plot is used in this season, the plot is 
forbidden to be used in a few years. This system is what 
we call the rotational grazing for sustainability of pasture. 
Because administration of the village is remitted to the 
board of village which consists of the head and 4 elected 
staffs, the usage of the village government pasture was 
also decided by the committee. The committee forces 




Table 1 Execution of Pasture Law 
Confiscation (ha) Delineation (ha) Confiscation (ha) Delineation (ha)
Province Done Targeted Done Targeted Province Done Targeted Done Targeted 
ADANA 0% 5,640 32% 33,851 KONYA 1% 379,357 3% 314,563
ADIYAMAN 0 0 KUTAHYA 0% 12,850 1% 11,948
AFYON 0 0% 695 MALATYA 18% 48,620 34% 161,111
AGRI 0% 2,553 74% 13,106 MANISA 30% 3,130 6% 14,897
AMASYA 0 0 K..MARAS 1% 145,318 26% 172,814
ANKARA 0% 12,736 0% 26,665 MARDIN 0% 12,965 13% 18,264
ANTALYA 0% 4,635 0% 1,389 MUGLA 0% 1,388 39% 7,035
ARTVIN 100% 16,144 100% 3,868 MUS 2% 59,794 24% 74,301
AYDIN 0% 9,471 0% 18,911 NEVSEHIR 16% 21,576 3% 168,735
BALIKESIR 0% 52,976 0% 47,761 NIGDE 0% 27,757 10% 24,122
BILECIK 11% 1,528 11% 1,535 ORDU 100% 32,382 100% 45,443
BINGOL 0 0 RIZE 98% 4,788 97% 40,730
BITLIS 0% 14,073 0% 51,949 SAKARYA 0 0
BOLU 0% 2,856 0% 8,960 SAMSUN 0% 8,382 0% 103
BURDUR 0% 6,977 0% 7,726 SIIRT 0 5% 637,787
BURSA 0% 12,885 11% 14,979 SINOP 0 0% 2,270
CANAKKAL 38% 4,737 15% 19,920 SIVAS 7% 40,403 100% 20,768
CANKIRI 0% 31,326 0% 67,947 TEKIRDAG 0% 32,996 0% 33,541
CORUM 0% 13,941 0% 30,359 TOKAT 5% 23,807 0% 3,749
DENIZLI 0% 4,263 0% 6,645 TRABZON 76% 2,460 95% 37,839
DIYARBAKI 0% 36,798 0 TUNCELI 0% 15,429 0% 5,569
EDIRNE 0% 55,100 0% 5,382 S.URFA 0 0
ELAZIG 0% 20,612 0% 20,612 USAK 0% 48,466 100% 2,246
ERZINCAN 0% 31,320 100% 2,816 VAN 67% 185,792 61% 412,936
ERZURUM 24% 31,274 0% 144,438 YOZGAT 0% 71,052 1% 116,015
ESKISEHIR 0% 62,582 0% 49,688 ZONGULDA 2% 142 43% 870
GAZIANTEP 0% 12,128 0% 44,232 AKSARAY 0% 1,470 0% 144,884
GIRESUN 100% 247 63% 47,560 BAYBURT 0% 19,096 0% 20,106
GUMUSHAN 60% 48,677 73% 59,264 KARAMAN 0% 51,127 0% 62,233
HAKKARI 0 100% 830 KIRIKKALE 0% 3,836 0% 8,950
HATAY 0% 3,896 0% 8,258 BATMAN 0% 13,310 2% 10,134
ISPARTA 0% 14,277 0% 13,955 SIRNAK 0% 13,089 0% 13,205
ICEL 100% 162 52% 58,179 BARTIN 0% 239 6% 1,854
ISTANBUL 0% 3,297 0% 1,644 ARDAHAN 0% 13,298 0% 16,465
IZMIR 0% 26,538 0% 12,366 IGDIR 59% 3,832 47% 8,290
KARS 0% 16,561 1% 32,786 YALOVA 0% 844 0% 791
KASTAMON 9% 5,597 31% 1,584 KARABUK 6% 889 55% 1,662
KAYSERI 9% 39,430 22% 84,148 KILIS 0% 6,698 0% 11,993
KIRKLAREL 0% 1,815 4% 30,411 OSMANIYE 2% 2,381 2% 2,381
KIRSEHIR 0% 45,508 0% 14,149 DUZCE 0% 1,899 0% 1,889
KOCAELI 0% 226 0% 714 TURKEY 13% 1,963,643 20% 3,621,773
 based on the Rotational grazing. Another case is Dagdibi 
village of Adana Province. The village government 
pasture of 5,000~6,000da is also controlled under 
rotational grazing for grass sustainability. In addition, 
according to the government project based on World 
Bank’s fund, fertilizers were spread on the pasture in last 
year and grass seeds are planed to be spread on the 
pasture in this year. According to the interviews of the 
village head, increase of grass yield can be recognized 
distinctly in this summer. But this project of pasture 
rehabilitation is just the special case. The projects and 
assignment of use right of government pasture to village, 
that is (3) and (4), are related to coping with overgrazing, 
but the concrete cases of (3) and (4) are still very few. On 
the contrary, places of border stone and confiscation, that 
is (1) and (2), which can cope well with excessive 
conversion based on pasture attack, are currently mainly 
being executed. We will henceforth focus on the pasture 
attack related issues of (1) and (2). 
 
4. Issues of Confiscation under the Pasture Law  
 
The pasture law is enacted in order to solve the 
pasture attack problems caused by inefficient institutional 
arrangements under the current land registry law. If so, is 
the pasture law intrinsically the efficient one to conserve 
and restore the government pasture? We need to examine 
the efficiency of institutional arrangement of the pasture 
law.  
We consider that the special institutional aspect of the 
pasture law is the confiscation that government dispossess 
the attacked pasture compulsorily. It is because the 
confiscation is contrary to the interest of pasture attacker, 
so that it makes the institutional arrangement more 
difficult and more inefficient. We establish the following 
3 issues that are linked to the confiscation and examine 
theoretically them in following sections. . 
(1) Choice between confiscation and reparation  
There are two ways for coping with the unlawful 
intrusion. One is confiscation and another is reparation by 
the intruder. The trouble of adversely possessed land is 
often resolved by reparation instead of confiscation, when 
confiscation costs monetarily and time-consumingly 
more than reparation. We need to examine whether the 
government’s confiscation is more efficient than 
reparation. 
(2) Cost and benefit of confiscation 
Transaction cost such as place of border stones, actual 
survey, judicial procedure, or exercise of police power 
must be also bore when the confiscation is executed. The 
benefit from restoration of government pasture can be 
gotten instead. We must investigate whether benefit 
covers cost efficiently on the case of confiscation.   
(3) The factors that affect the execution of confiscation 
  Even though Turkish government started to try to 
confiscate the intruded area, only a small portion of 
intruded government pasture has been restored. In fact, 
the confiscation can not be executed perfectly. We must 
investigate the factors that affect the execution of 
confiscation.  
 
5. Theoretical Framework for Analysis of the 
Pasture Law 
 
The raison d’etre of law is assessed by both equity 
and efficiency. If judicial judgment were one sided, 
principle of equity would be collapsed and social order 
would break down. If judicial judgment caused waste 
resource, principle of efficiency would be collapsed and 
society could not be sustainable. These are the reasons 
why the importance of equity and efficiency is 
emphasized. Equity is the domain that hitherto 
jurisprudence mainly dealt with. But efficiency is the 
domain that jurisprudence does not dealt deeply in but 
economics is strong in. The judicial judgment based on 
the law must be equal to the most efficient agreement that 
is socially acceptable after exhaustive negotiations among 
privies. The most efficient agreement is driven from the 
courthouse’s arbitration that the one maximizes his utility 
subject to the constraint that the other has already 
maximized his utility. This concept of the most efficient 
agreement is equal to Pareto optimality that is also sought 
in Economics. This is the reason why there are spheres 
that economics can take an active part in jurisprudence. 
Interdisciplinary studies between jurisprudence and 
economics has been often applied to analysis of law in the 
last decade, which is called as Economics and Law4）.  
The above mentioned issues of confiscation can be 
investigated with the simple model that is originated by 
the author based on economics and law. There are two 
encountered parties, namely the pasture attacker who has 
intruded unlawfully the government pasture and the 
government who tries to confiscate the intruded area. The 
confiscation brings about the conflict between them. 
Basically the attacker is to blame, because he intruded the 
state demesne. But the fault is partly laid to the 
 government’s charge, for the government’s inefficient 
institutional arrangement has caused the pasture attack. If 
an attacker has occupied the area of government pasture 
for long enough years, he must be allowed to acquire the 
area in problem by prescription. The problem is the case 
that the attacker claims his ownership without any 
evidences. In the case, both sides claim the ownership and 
are brought into conflict. The conflict should be mediated 
under the third party that is independent from both parties. 
The typical third party is the courthouse. Actually there 
are so many cases that farmer institutes a suit against 
government about ownership of his occupied crop land in 
question. If we could collect adequate number of the 
precedents for pasture confiscation suits, we could 
provide strong evidence to our theoretical analysis. But, 
because of difficulties of collecting official judicial 
documents in Turkey, first we focus on theoretical studies 
in this paper.   
We can investigate the efficiency of confiscation by 
assuming that the conflict is resolved based on the judicial 
judgment. Let p (0  p 1) be the attacker’s probability 
assessment of winning a suit. Let q (0  q  1) be the 
government’s probability assessment of winning a suit  
Different attacker has different p and different 
government officer in charge has different q. Let P be the 
attacker’s total probability assessment of winning a suit 
that is representative of all attackers’ assessments. Let Q 
be the government’s total probability assessment of 
wining a suit that is representative of all officers’ 
assessments. The judicial judgment arbitrates the conflict 
based on Pareto optimality, because it is the only one 
agreement that can be concluded between two parties in 
the most efficient institutional arrangement. The 
courthouse ought to judge the agreement in the way that 
P is equal to 1-Q and Q is equal to 1-P on the basis of 
Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality is realized on the 
point that the attackers maximizes their total expected 
value based on P subject to the constraint that the 
government officers have already maximized their total 
expected value based on Q. Suppose the judicial 
judgment is P* (=1-Q*) and Q*(=1-P*). All attackers and 
government officers are obliged to agree on the point of 
the courthouse’s P* and 1-P* ( , that is Q* and 1-Q*). 
 
6.  Efficiency of Confiscation under the Pasture 
Law 
 
First, issues of (1) choice between confiscation and 
reparation and (2) cost and benefit of confiscation will be 
examined in this section. Now suppose that the value of 
the intruded area for the pasture attacker is V which 
creates return of harvests. On the judicial judgment, P* 
becomes equal to 1-Q* and Q* becomes equal to 1-P* in 
order to conclude agreement between the attacker’s party 
and the government’s party. In that case, P* represents 
1-Q*, so that Q* is not needed to be referred. Transaction 
cost TC such as judicial cost is required in order to 
conclude the agreement. Basically the party who lose a 
suit must bear the transaction cost. 
6-1) Confiscation or reparation 
If government gives up the idea of confiscation and 
makes attacker pay indemnity in compensation for 
occupation of intruded area, the agreement between two 
parties can also be reached by reparation rule. There are 
actually a few such cases in Turkey. Let the indemnity be 
X. The total expected value of the attacker and the 
government under reparation rule is respectively 
therefore,  
A (Attacker) : E(A) = P V + (1-P)(V-X) – (1-P)TC (1) 
G (Government) : E(G) = (1-Q)＊0 +Q X – (1-Q)TC (2) 
On the judicial judgment, (1) and (2) become 
A (Attacker) : E*(A) = P* V + (1-P*)(V-X) – (1-P*)TC  
(3) 
G (Government) : E*(G) = P*＊0 + (1-P*) X – P*TC (4) 
The social welfare that fulfills the condition of Pareto 
optimality is summation of expression (3) and (4). That is 
E*(A)+ E*(G) = V- TC   (5) 
(5) is the frontier line on which both parties can agree 
under the judicial arbitration, regardless of P*(or Q*) and 
X. If the social welfare is positive, that is V > TC, the 
agreement of both parties can  be concluded under the 
reparation rules, irrespective of the courthouse judgment 
P* and indemnity X. This is called as Coase Theorem5）. 
The reparation rule could be efficient under only this 
condition.  
But the reparation is exceptional instance and there is 
no case interviewed in our field surveys in Adana and 
Konya province. Government pasture is prohibited 
strictly by the government from being used as crop land. 
The government will accept the reparation rules only in 
the case that the attacker uses the intruded area as pasture. 
But it is impossible to make the attacker use it as pasture, 
because pasture is of no value for him. So far as both 
parties will not make a compromise with each other, the 
transaction cost under reparation is prohibitive, that is V < 
TC. Therefore, the reparation rule is concluded to be 
 inefficient institutional arrangement, so that the other 
confiscation rule must be adopted by the government. 
6-2) Cost and Benefit of Confiscation 
The confiscation is now tried to be executed by police 
power under the pasture law. If attacker does not return 
the intruded area to the government, the area is compelled 
to be confiscated and the attacker is supposed to be 
amerced in the sum of M in which negative value of 
imprisonment is included. But he may be allowed to 
acquire the occupied area of government pasture by 
prescription, in the case of long years occupation. The 
conflict between both parties is caused by the case that the 
attacker claims his ownership without any evidences.  
Let P be the attacker’s total probability assessment of 
wining a suit that the intruded area can be held out on by 
the attacker. Let Q be the government’s total probability 
assessment of winning a suit that the intruded area can be 
retrieved by the government. In the case that the area can 
be confiscated, the attacker can gain nothing but penalty. 
Suppose that government is given M intact and that both 
parties evaluate the area at V. Transaction cost TC such as 
judicial cost must be bore by the party who lose a suit. 
The total expected value of the attacker and the 
government under confiscation rule is respectively 
therefore,  
A (Attacker) : E(A) = P V + (1-P)(-M) – (1-P)TC     
(6) 
G (Government) : E(G) = (1-Q)＊0 +Q(V+M) – 
(1-Q)TC    (7) 
On the judicial judgment, (6) and (7) become 
A (Attacker)    : E*(A) = P* V + (1-P*) (-M)– 
(1-P*)TC  (8) 
G (Government) : E*(G) = P*＊0 + (1-P*)(V+M) – 
P*TC    (9) 
The social welfare that fulfills the condition of Pareto 
optimality is summation of expression (8) and (9). That is 
E*(A)+ E*(G) = V- TC   (10) 
(10) is also the frontier line on which both parties can 
agree under the judicial arbitration, regardless of P*(or 
Q*) and M. If the social welfare is positive, that is V > 
TC, the agreement of both parties can be concluded under 
the confiscation rules, irrespective of the courthouse 
judgment P* and amercement M. This is also understood 
as Coase Theorem. As the frontier of land has been 
vanishing and the size of unreclaimed land has been 
decreasing, the value of government pasture has been 
increasing. So far as the benefit of the retrieved 
government pasture area is expected to be higher than the 
transaction cost necessary for confiscating processes, the 
confiscation rule is concluded to be the efficient 
institutional arrangement. Judging by the interview of 
local government in Konya, we can say Turkish 
government has decided to execute the new pasture law 
progressively.  
 
7. Social Agreement on Confiscation under the 
Pasture Law 
 
Finally, issues of (3), namely the factors that affect 
execution of confiscation will be examined in this section.  
Under the confiscation rule, both attacker and 
government can agree on the frontier line, that is to say 
expression (10) regardless of P*, because Pareto 
optimality is fulfilled. Next thing of judicial judgment to 
do is decision of social agreement P** that both parties 
accept. P** stands for the degree of the confiscation that 
actually can be executed. The courthouse gives the ruling 
in the way that the attacker win a suit in P** ＊100 %. 
As P** is larger, the judgment case favorable to the 
attacker is more. As P** is smaller, the judgment case 
favorable to the government is more.  
According to Nash-bargained solution, the attacker and 
the government jointly choose the social agreement P** 
to maximize the product of their expected value E*(A) 
and E*(G), subject to their Pareto optimality. The product 
is a kind of acceptable social utility.  That is 
Max  E*(A)＊E*(G)  
= Max (P* V + (1-P*) (-M)– (1-P*)TC )＊(P*＊0 + 
(1-P*)(V+M) – P*TC)    (11)  
 s.t.  E*(A)+E*(G)=V-TC      (12) 
The necessary condition of this social agreement P** is 
P**=(V+2M+TC)/2(V+M+TC)     (13) 
The courthouse arbitrates both parties according to this 
P** and the attacker is obliged to return the intruded area 
in the possibility of P** ＊100 %.  
There are three factors that interact to affect the degree 
of confiscation execution P**, that is the evaluation of the 
intruded area V, amercement M, and transaction cost such 
as judicial cost TC. In order to investigate the influence of 
V, M, and TC on P**, provided the other factors remain 
unchanged, P** is differentiated by each variable as 
follows.  
dP**/dV=-2M/(2V+2M+2TC)2<0             (14) 
dP**/dTC=--2M/(2V+2M+2TC)2<0            (15) 
dP**/dM=(2V+2TC)/(2V+2M+2TC)2> 0       (16) 
These are concluded as following. First, the degree of 
 confiscation execution P** is proportional to the 
incremental land value of the intruded area V. The higher 
the intruded area is evaluated, the more progressively the 
confiscation will be executed. At the present, the frontier 
of land has been vanishing and both the government and 
the public has started to revaluate the government pasture. 
In fact, the Turkish government is going forward the 
confiscation and the attackers cannot help fulfilling the 
pasture law policy. 
Second, on the contrast, the lower the intruded area is 
evaluated, the more difficultly the confiscation will be 
executed. If less precipitation reduces the marginal 
productivity of the intruded area, it will result in 
decreasing the evaluation of the area and reducing the 
attacker’s agricultural income. The attacker will strongly 
insist on continuing to occupy the area in problem in 
order to keep his total agricultural farm income level. 
Decrease of precipitation affects the confiscation 
execution negatively. 
Third, the degree of confiscation execution P** is 
inversely proportional to the incremental amercement M. 
It is futile to fine the attacker heavily in order to promote 
the confiscation, because the attacker resists the avaricious 
government policy and is not willing to compromise 
easily. Heavy punishment can not reduce cases of lawless 
act.  
Forth, the more transaction cost TC the attacker 
incurs, the more progressively the confiscation will be 
executed. Compared with the case of government, it is 
more burdensome for individual attacker to bear the 
transaction cost such as judicial cost. The attacker may 
favorite to fulfill the government order rather than 
suffering from the complicated formalities in courthouse.   
 
8. Concluding Remark 
 
The government pasture has been drastically 
destroyed since 1950, due to the excessive conversion of 
the pasture to other use and the overgrazing. The most 
serious factor in causing fast destruction of the 
government pasture is the unlawful intrusion, that is what 
we call pasture attack. Pasture attack was the results of 
inefficient institutional arrangement under the land 
registry law, so that Turkish government newly enacted 
the pasture law in 1998 in order to resolve the institutional 
inefficiency. According to the pasture law, the intruded 
area of the government pasture is now tried to be 
confiscated by the government.    
We theoretically examined the efficiency of the new 
pasture law in this paper. Judging from the present 
situation that both Turkish government and the public 
reevaluates the value of government pasture, the 
confiscation rule is considered to be intrinsically efficient 
device rather than any other rules at the present. However, 
on the case that the crop productivity of the intruded area 
is decreased by some reasons such as climate change, the 
confiscation will be executed more difficultly. It is 
because the attacker will insist on continuing to occupy 
the area in problem in order to keep his income level.  
 
＜Note＞ 
1) On the contrast, the government forest has been 
conserved carefully under rigorous application of the law 
of forest (law no.6838). 99% of forest belongs to state 
treasury and lumbering is completely controlled by the 
government. The border of forest is being firmly fenced 
against intrusion. 
2)  We introduce two typical cases of pasture attack. 
One is the case of Kilicli village in Adana. There is hilly 
area where trees grow sparsely and animals are grazed on 
the underbrush of there in the village. ‘Tapu’ officials 
came to this village in 1960’s and agricultural land was 
registered with ‘tapu’ at that time. But, compared with the 
size of hilly area at that time, it has reduced strongly 
without notice. The size that used to be 4,000da 
(1da=0.1ha) 20 years ago has reduced to 2,000~3,000da 
by pasture attack until now.  
Another case is Buyukbrnak village in Konya. In this 
village many farmers attacked the government pasture 
unlawfully, even though they know the fact of intrusion. 
The agricultural land is 22,000da in area. The area of 
pasture is 21,026.00509da which is divided among 
31plots. 397.733da of whom used to be intruded and 
200da was returned to the government. In other words, 
5% of pasture was intruded and 3% of pasture are still 
unlawfully occupied by unjust farmers. 
3)  According to the original sentences by G.Hardin, 
tragedy of commons is described as fallowing. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit 
– in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in 
a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
(Hardin(1968) , The Tragedy of Commons, Science 162, 
p1244) 
4) See Miceli,T.(1997), ”Economics of the Law : Torts, 
 Contracts, Property, Litigation”, Oxford. 
5）The Coase theorem is defined in Miceli,T.(1997) , p9 
as following. 
The Coase theorem says that if transaction costs are 
low enough to permit bargaining between the parties to 
an externality, and if property rights are well defined, 
then the initial assignment of rights will not affect the 
ultimate allocation of resources, which will be efficient.   
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